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Chapter 1
Introduction
One of the most significant technological developments during the last few 
years has been the emergence of the Internet. With rapid growth of the 
Internet, it is becoming increasingly difficult to provide the necessary ser-
vices to all users within a designated time period. As the gap between the 
network-line and application-server rates is growing, it is getting easier to 
launch Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks against services on 
the Internet, and remain undetected within the network. The end-to-end 
argument suggests that simple functions that are common to all applica-
tions be performed by network computers (e.g., routers), and complex 
functions required by fewer applications be implemented in end-servers 
[16]. With hardware performance improving day by day, network line rates 
tend to go higher, whereas, complex end-server applications and operating 
system features offset equivalent improvements at the end-system level [9].1
During a DDoS attack, a server is repeatedly sent requests from numer-
ous machines, typically called “zombies”, that are controlled by a master 
process. The master process will trigger a ‘go’ signal to launch an attack 
against the victim server in hope of flooding the server with an unusually 
high number of requests, and cause the server to crash. The server is thus 
unable to process any further requests until further action is taken to restore 
its state [17].
Extensive work has been done to provide solutions to the DDoS problem 
at the transport layer and below of an open network, as presented in Chap-
ter 2. However, assuming all attacks at and below the transport layer are 
taken care of, the threat of a potential attack against publicly accessible 
application services still remains imminent. The main reason for this threat 
is the exceeding demand for services for the same server capacity, and 
lower server throughput as compared to the network line rate, thus making 
the victims more susceptible to an attack. The flooding-based attacks of 
February 2000 against the public service of Yahoo!, Ebay, and E*trade, as 
well as the January 2001 attacks against Microsoft’s name servers had sta-
tistics that clearly showed no unusual network traffic, however the servers 
were incapacitated as the service demand exceeded their respective capaci-
ties [15].2
The DDoS attacks against the root DNS servers during October 2002 
were launched simultaneously from various attacking points on the Inter-
net, and targeted all the thirteen root DNS servers. Only four of them with-
stood the attack. The attack lasted for about an hour, during which DNS 
was disabled. The financial losses incurred due to such attacks can be very 
high, as all servers, including e-commerce servers, frequently rely on root 
DNS services for timely completion of transactions [17].
Gligor’s Rate Control Scheme
The rate control scheme proposed by Gligor in [9] is a novel mechanism 
for providing access guarantees to clients for accessing public services, by 
generating and enforcing simple user-level agreements on dedicated special 
purpose servers. These servers cannot be flooded, as they operate at the 
peak network line rate of the front-end network access points (e.g. edge 
routers). The scheme also uses the CAPTCHA[23] technique, which is a 
reverse Turing test for controlling the client proliferation on adversary-con-
trolled machines, but only to decrease the waiting time to service for legiti-
mate clients.
When active (during peak traffic), an exception is raised by the server’s 
request Verifier, directing the client’s proxy to a special purpose server, 
called the rate control server (RCS), to obtain a valid ticket containing a 3
time window during which its request will be processed, and an access 
count (wopt) specifying the number of accesses allowed. The client then 
has to approach a ticket Verifier (dedicated server) that checks the validity 
of all requests, and mediates access to the server. In addition to checking 
the ticket validity, the Verifier also keeps track of the number of times the 
client has already accessed the service during the current time slot, so as to 
confirm client eligibility for service access. Within a particular time win-
dow, per client information regarding the number of times a client has 
already visited the server is kept, in order to enforce the agreement (time 
window, number of accesses) initially made between the client and the 
server [9]. 
The rate control scheme explained in detail in Chapter 3 thus controls the 
client request rate to the application server, thwarting the chances of a 
flooding attack. In addition, flash crowds (unusually high pikes in traffic 
during peak hours caused by legitimate clients) are also taken care of by the 
scheme, thus not letting the server be overwhelmed by requests at any 
given time [9].
Contributions of the Thesis
Simulations were carried out to analyze the performance of the rate con-
trol scheme when applied to two classes of servers, namely, Content Distri-4
bution Networks (CDNs), and Domain Name Server (DNS)-based 
networks. The experiment consisted of simulating a large network with 
parameters obtained from statistics of these networks, and analyzing the 
server utilization and client waiting times. In addition, server behavior for 
varying client populations was also studied.
The simulation experiment confirmed our expectations in the following 
three areas:
1. Variations in the number of clients affects the client waiting time; e.g., 
small request-interarrival times during an attack suggest that clients arrive 
to the RCS at about the same time, and are provided with server accesses 
within time windows well ahead into the future. Simulation results showed 
that the average waiting time varies proportionally with increase in the 
number of clients.
2. Increases in the maximum inter-request time between two consecutive 
requests to the application server by the same client (δr) leads to higher 
waiting times for clients. Results obtained from the simulation confirm the 
expected behavior, namely that higher values of δr resulted in higher wait-
ing times as compared to lower values. The results also helped us place a 
bound on the value of δr for the experimented servers namely, CDN and 
DNS, so as to provide clients with more reasonable maximum waiting 
times to service.5
3. The average number of accesses for a protocol, Ar, also has a direct 
impact on the server utilization, with higher values leading to lower server 
utilization as compared to lower values. The results obtained from the sim-
ulations confirmed that with higher Ar server utilization is low, as com-
pared to lower values, as is explained in Chapter 4.
Thesis Outline
Chapter 2 reviews prior work in the area of DDoS, and gives a brief 
explanation of schemes that have been proposed to solve this problem at 
various levels. Chapter 3 explains the detailed working of the rate control 
scheme. The analysis of the results obtained when the rate control scheme 
is implemented in two different server networks, namely, CDN and DNS, is 
given in Chapters 4, 5. Concluding remarks, with future directions for 
research are given in Chapter 6.6
Chapter 2
Related Work
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks aim to deny clients access to service pro-
vided by the victim (server, router, or the network). Attackers either exploit 
weaknesses in the system, for which patches are later issued upon discov-
ery of the attack, or the victim is forced to undertake computationally 
intensive tasks, such as exponentiation with large integers for Diffie-Hell-
man key exchanges [6].
In contrast, flooding-based attacks, do not rely on any particular network 
or system weaknesses. Instead, they tend to exploit the asymmetry that 
exists between the network and the victim by amassing a large clan of hosts 
to simultaneously send useless packets towards the victim, leading to a 
flood of requests at the victim’s end. The intensity of the traffic is high 
enough to jam or crash either the victim, or its network. Launching a flood-
ing attack has become relatively easy today owing to the free availability of 
a number of tools for carrying out such attacks, such as Trinoo, Trib Flood 7
Network 2000, and Stacheldraht. These tools allow the attacking host to 
install patches of the attack program on innocent agents, aka. “zombies”. 
The program is tuned to launch an attack against a particular victim at a 
particular time. Thus, the victim is flooded with requests coming in from 
all directions at an enormously high magnitude [6][22].
Broadly speaking, DDoS attacks can be classified into two categories:
1. Direct Attacks: In a direct attack, the attacker arranges to send a large 
number of attack packets directly to the victim. SYN flooding is the most 
common attack case, in which TCP SYN packets are sent to the victim’s 
server port. The victim will respond by sending back a SYN-ACK response 
to the source address of the packet. Since the source address of the packet 
was spoofed, the victim will not receive the third message of the 3-way 
handshake required for connection establishment in TCP. Thus the number 
of half open connections at the victim’s end consume all the available 
memory, forcing the victim to deny service to subsequent clients (including 
legitimate clients) [6].
2. Reflector Attacks: In a reflector attack, intermediate nodes (reflectors), 
are used as innocent attack launchers. The attacker sends packets with 
source addresses set to the victim’s address. Without realizing that the 
packets had spoofed source addresses, the reflectors send the response to 8
the requests to the victim. As a result, the victim’s link is flooded with 
responses to reflected packets [6].
Figure 2.1: Flooding-based DDoS attacks: a) direct b) reflector. [6]
As can be seen from the two types of attacks depicted above, the attacker 
manages to used spoofed network addresses to flood the victim with use-
less packets. The solution to this problem is to place routers with capabili-
ties of filtering packets launched from within their local networks, with 
spoofed IP addresses, and track down potential attackers.
Filtering-based approach
In [6], Chang proposes a 3-tier approach for tackling the DDoS problem, 
namely:
a) Attack prevention and preemption (before the attack).
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c) Attack source traceback and identification (during and after the 
attack).
The author goes on to explain that attack preemption can be done by 
ensuring that hosts are secured against master and agent implants, that may 
secretly involve the host into the attack. Attack must be detected, and IP 
traceback must be done in order to discover the attack sources. After identi-
fying the attack sources, appropriate filtering must be done in order to scan 
and rid the network of attack packets. However, it is not guaranteed that all 
packets dropped were attack packets, and in the process legitimate users 
may be denied service.
Dedicated Application-based Detection Approach
In [7], Elliott suggests host-specific security agents to be installed in 
hosts on different platforms, to ensure prevention of a local system from 
becoming a zombie agent. The proactive security agent automatically 
audits systems, continually finding problems, and fixing them. A security 
agent must be designated in an organization, who regularly takes the fin-
gerprint of the host machine, and ensures that the key system files haven’t 
changed. If any system changes have been made by the attacker, the auditor 
is authorized to fix the application which was either newly installed, or an 
existing application was altered.10
In [11], Kashiwa et al. suggest an active shaping-based approach for tack-
ling the DDoS problem. In their method, program modules called Active 
Components (ACs) are loaded into the network nodes, which may be rout-
ers, to implement application-level functions to detect, backtrack, and 
defend against attacks at the network level. They suggest an algorithm for 
detection of the attack, which heavily relies on traffic characteristics before 
taking any decisions. The AC watches the amount of traffic during a given 
time period, and if it exceeds the throughput threshold, it concludes that an 
attack is in progress, and creates suspicious signatures for the “attack” 
packets. The attack packets are classified either by the front-end router of 
the attacker, which figures out malicious packets by looking at the spoofed 
source address, or by the local AC, which looks at unusually high traffic 
received from specific hosts. These hosts are blacklisted, and further 
requests from them are considered to be a part of the attack, and thus 
dropped. 
One of the main areas of concern for this approach is the probability of 
legitimate packets being dropped. These packets may be arising from cli-
ents, who are unknowingly involved in a flash crowd at the server end, and 
thus may be denied service because of the false assumptions made by the 
AC.11
Dedicated Network-based Detection Approach
In [22], Weiler proposes a honeypot mechanism to lure the attackers into 
a fantasy world, considered to be a honeypot, which is a mock network, 
while protecting the actual network behind a firewall. This is a two-
pronged approach; Firstly, to defend the operational network from a DDoS 
attack, Secondly, to trap the attacker for possible legal action against 
him/her.
Figure 2.2: Honeypots for protection against DDoS attacks
As can be seen in the above figure, the attacker is lured by the honeypot, 
and is made to believe that he has successfully infiltrated and compromised 
an actual client to become a slave, however in reality, he’s gotten himself 







ated in a “demilitarized” zone, and can be accessed from the outside world. 
The local network is in another zone, protected by a firewall, which is regu-
larly updated. Client signatures are employed to detect an attack, and for-
ward subsequent requests to the honeypot rather than the actual clients 
[22].
The scheme proposes a novel trap for attackers, but doesn’t provide any 
mechanism of guaranteeing that clients that are considered to be attackers 
are actually so, and thus there exists a non-zero probability of denying ser-
vice to legitimate clients.
Anomaly Detection
Management Information Base (MIB) traffic variables were used to study 
anomalies in traffic patterns, and detect attacks in progress in [5]. These 
variables are regularly observed for unusual changes in their values at the 
Network Monitoring System (NMS) level. Unusual patterns in traffic are 
considered as attacks in progress, and necessary action is taken to prevent 
the server from being flooded. 
The decision as to whether a particular flow is an attack or not cannot be 
taken at the network level, as the clients are not aware of the secret filtering 
policies, as well as upper limit rates at which, say, ping packets can be sent 13
to the front-end router before crashing it. Thus anomaly detection cannot 
be considered as a strong solution to the DDoS attack problem.
Client-Puzzle based Service Guarantees 
Client puzzles require that each client solve a puzzle as proof of work to 
accompany its request to the server. The server decides whether to process 
the clients request or not only after receiving the appropriate proof of work. 
The strength k of the puzzle is either determined by the client or by the 
server depending on the scheme. Certain servers may preempt queued 
requests from clients that solved simpler puzzles, with requests from cli-
ents accompanying solutions to more complex puzzles [21]. The server 
scheduler checks the puzzle solutions at the network-line rate. Client 
requests that either solved the puzzle incorrectly, or not at all, are dropped. 
In spite of these drops, if the client-request arrival rate is still high at puzzle 
level k, the server drops the extra requests, and expects clients whose 
requests where dropped to bid with a higher-strength puzzle, say k+1 [9].
Typical client puzzles use crypto-hash functions, where the output of the 
hash function is between 128 and 160 bits for k between 1 and 64 bits. 
Thus, the puzzle computation cost to the client is exponential in k. In [2], 
the client challenge puzzle is to find a hash function output with k consecu-
tive zeroes in the high-order bits. 14
Puzzles have the advantage of being stateless, as the server does not have 
to store any per-client information locally for deciding to give access to the 
clients, however, they are ineffective in the role of user agreements for pre-
venting DDoS attacks, as they combine weak service-access guarantees 
with high request overheads. There is no way of distinguishing between 
good and bad clients based on the same puzzle difficulty level, and there is 
a weak guarantee that inspite of solving a series of puzzles with increasing 
difficulty levels, a client may be provided with service [9]. 
In addition, when adversaries with unknown computation power are 
present in the open network, client puzzles do not strongly guarantee 
access to legitimate clients even after say r retries with varying levels of 
puzzle difficulty. As can be seen from above, client puzzles do not provide 
strong access guarantees to legitimate clients during the event of a DDoS 
attack.15
Chapter 3
Rate Control Scheme with Maximum Waiting 
Time Guarantees
The rate control service (RCS) simulated in this thesis is application-spe-
cific, and ensures that the aggregate rate of request generation of the total 
client population does not exceed the maximum processing rate of the 
application server, given by L/τ = S, during any time interval τ or larger, 
where L is the queue length at the application server, and S is the applica-
tion server processing rate (requests/sec). When the rate control scheme is 
in operation during heavy traffic periods, clients have to obtain a valid 
ticket from the RCS in order to access the application service either once, 
or multiple times within a single time window, depending on the type of 
service (e.g. Authentication, Naming, Email) being accessed. Clients are 
allowed to place their respective requests within these time windows, and 
are guaranteed a maximum waiting time to service within the upper limit of 
the window [9].16
Figure 3.1: Rate Control Scheme
Ticket Issuance 
A client request for a ticket contains the following parameters - number 
of accesses desired, the source IP address from which the requests will be 
issued, the start time of the window in which the requests will be issued, ts, 
the number of accesses desired, and the maximum interval between two 
consecutive requests, δr, if the client wants to access the service multiple 
number of times. The RCS verifies that the number of accesses desired and 
δr are consistent with the server-access protocol, and that ts is within the 
ticket postdating time allowed, so that tickets with requested start times 
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Clients 17
issues the ticket, and a message authentication code (MAC) accompanying 
it. [9]
The ticket contains the following parameters: 
(1) Start time (ti); (2) End time (ti+1); (3) Maximum number of accesses, 
wopt; (4) The source IP address for the request; (5) Time of ticket issue 
(tRCS). The start time is set to be ti = tw + ∆, where tw > ts is the first time 
window available at the application server for issuance of a request. The 
time of ticket issue at the RCS, tRCS, allows the client to synchronize with 
the time at the verifier. The communication delay ∆ ensures that the ticket 
is valid upon receipt by the client, and tw > ts ensures that the client has 
time to issue a request. The window end time is given by: ti+1= ti + wopt (τ 
+ 2∆ + δr), where the network delay ∆ is for the client request to reach the 
verifier, for request processing in the worst case time period of τ, and for 
ticket validity before the next access, ∆ + δr. The verifier maintains a cache 
of tickets seen within the current time window, and the number of accesses 
already availed by each ticket, to strictly implement the access agreement 
made earlier with the clients. 
Ticket Usage and Integrity
Upon receiving the ticket, clients may send their requests to the ticket 
verifier along with their tickets for verification purposes, and if verification 18
is successful, their requests are forwarded to the application service. The 
verifier usually sits between the front-end router and the application server 
in the server network, and is time synchronized with the RCS. Both the ver-
ifier and the RCS share a symmetric key. The RCS uses the key to generate 
MAC for each ticket, and the verifier uses the key to verify the authenticity 
of the ticket. The MAC ensures that the ticket integrity is maintained, and 
that it is not tampered with on the way. 
The computation of the MAC could be done in many ways using the 
shared secret key, and thus it is not possible for anyone without the knowl-
edge of the key to compute the correct MAC. In order to manipulate the 
values or parameters in the ticket to increase the number of accesses, or to 
change the source IP address given in the ticket, the MAC has to be recom-
puted with the correct shared secret key, and since only the verifier and the 
RCS have access to the secret key, no third party can compute a new MAC 
with the same shared key. Therefore, any modification to the ticket is easily 
detectable at the ticket verifier by the verification of the MAC accompany-
ing the ticket and the request. MAC computation is the most time consum-
ing task performed, however, it can be performed in parallel, at rates much 
faster than the network line rate. In addition, the size of the ticket is very 
small (< 1 KB), and thus the computation will not take much time.19
Session Cookie
The RCS and the verifier ensure that the aggregate request rate doesn’t 
exceed the server’s throughput, by issuing tickets in accordance with the 
server processing rate, however, an adversary can start a large number of 
clients on a number of different machines to obtain valid tickets, and either 
abstain from placing their respective requests in the allotted time slots to 
lead to an underutilization of resources at the server end, or to push legiti-
mate clients further off into the future before service is provided to them, 
thus increasing their MWT beyond reasonable values. In order to prevent 
uncontrolled client proliferation by an adversary, the scheme requires that 
each ticket request from a client be accompanied by a cryptographic cookie 
attesting that the client has a human user behind it. The client must pass the 
reverse Turing test (or CAPTCHA [1][9]) in order to prove so and obtain a 
cookie, similar in structure to a ticket, and containing the following: (1) 
start time; (2) end time; (3) list of IP addresses from which ticket requests 
can be issued; (4) tRCS; (5) MAC for the cookie. The time window of the 
cookie is ideally equivalent to a login session, and thus the reverse Turing 
test is required only once at the beginning of the session [9].20
How many accesses to give?
The number of accesses to be provided to a client during a time window, 
wopt, has a significant impact on both the performance of the system, as 
well as the client perceived waiting time. If a single access is allowed, the 
communication cost for the clients increases owing to the more number of 
visits to the RCS for tickets. In contrast, if all accesses are given within a 
single window, unused tickets by adversary’s clients could decrease server 
utilization due to reserved but unused time windows (underutilization 
attack). The optimal window size is computed as a tradeoff between the 
server under-utilization and the number of requests to the RCS [9]. Letting 
c1 to be the unit cost of a round trip to the RCS, c2 the unit cost of lost 
server utilization due to abstinence from placing requests by illegitimate 
clients, Ar the access count per application, and l the percentage of legiti-
mate clients in the system, , the optimal window size in terms of the 
access count can be computed as a minimization of the total cost: 
Ctotal = Cclient + Cserver.= c1Ar/wopt + c2(1-l) wopt.
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Wopt and its significance
As can be seen from the formula given above to compute wopt, the value 
of wopt increases considerably with increasing value of l, for fixed Ar, 
c1/c2. There are four different combinations of wopt and interarrival times 
(t), that have varying implications in the study:
1. High l and High t imply greater percentage of legitimate clients, arriv-
ing after considerably long intervals of time (not a flash crowd).
2. High l and Low t imply a Flash Crowd of legitimate clients arriving at 
very short spans of time.
3. Low l and Low t imply a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack, 
with greater percentage of illegitimate clients, arriving at shorter intervals 
of time, in order to flood the server, and incapacitate it from serving legiti-
mate clients.
4. Low l and High t imply a greater percentage of illegitimate clients, 
arriving after longer spans in time (not a DDoS attack).22
Chapter 4
Simulation Analysis
4.1 Rate Control Scheme applied to CDNs
Content Distribution Networks (CDNs) are widely popular distributed 
systems on the Internet that distribute client requests to an appropriate 
server based on a number of factors; viz., server load, network proximity, 
cache locality, so as to minimize the load on the system, and to reduce the 
client perceived response time (latency). With exponential growth in the 
usage of the Internet and a lack of proportional growth of server resources, 
resources tend to get exhausted more often, and are more vulnerable to 
flooding-based attacks, such as DDoS. Even if a system is not under attack, 
it may be that the server resources are exhausted due to “flash crowds”, 
which may be caused by lots off legitimate clients who unknowingly place 
their requests at very short time intervals, thus flooding the server, and 
bringing it to down to an irrecoverable state.23
4.1.1 Working of CDNs
Content Distribution Networks (CDNs), geographically distribute server 
surrogates that cache pages, instead of placing them all within the same 
subnet. Thus, a client requesting the same page twice may be led to a dif-
ferent server each time. The aim of this content distribution is to reduce the 
client perceived latencies, by redirecting clients to appropriate servers 
based on their geographical locations, server surrogate load, and other fac-
tors, which may include priority to important clients. Several algorithms 
were proposed [20] for deciding the distribution of client requests. Some of 
them are:
1. Modulo Hashing: The URL is hashed to a number modulo the number 
of servers. The resultant value is the server number, which is given to the 
client.
2. Consistent Hashing: The URL is hashed to a number in a large, circu-
lar space, as are the names of the servers. The URL is assigned to the server 
that lies closest on the circle on its hash value. If a server node fails, the 
load is shifted to its neighbors.
3. Highest Random Weight: A list is generated by hashing the URL and 
the server’s name, and sorting the results. Each URL then has a determinis-24
tic order to access the set of servers, and this list is traversed until a suitably 
loaded server is found. 
4. Dynamic Replication with Network Proximity: The effective load on a 
server is multiplied with the distance between the client and the closest 
server, and the appropriate server is selected to provide service to the client.
The average number of requests per second handled by a typical CDN 
server is 600 [20].
Considering the wide ranging impact that a DDoS attack can have on a 
CDN network, owing to the extent of usage of such a network, we decided 
to run simulations by implementing the rate control scheme described ear-
lier to CDNs, with parameters closely resembling many CDNs widely 
deployed on the Internet today.
4.1.2 Simulation Experiment
Simulations were carried out to analyze the performance of the server, 
and the client waiting times, when the rate control scheme is implemented 
in a CDN. The front-end router processing rate operates at the ticket gener-
ation + processing rate of the rate control server, so as not to flood the rate 
control server at any time. The simulator was written in C, and was run for 
different client populations, with exponential traffic arrival rate to the rate 
control server. 25
Assumptions
The following assumptions were made for the simulations:
1. The counter values (wopt) given to individual clients based upon their 
requests, were decided as follows:
, where,
c1: unit cost of communication = 200 ms 
c2: unit cost of computation = 16, 1000 ms 
Ar: access count per application = 6-60
l: percentage of legitimate clients in the system
δr: maximum inter-request delay requested by a client = 3-30 ms [14]
2. Clients were assumed to have independent, non-overlapping windows 
of time at the Application Server, during which they may place their 
requests.
3. Time window computation was done as follows:
ti = tw + ∆
ti+1 = ti + w(τ + 2∆ + δr) 
4. The traffic arrival process at the RCS was poisson, with exponential 
interarrival times.
5. The Verifier rejects requests that are not eligible to fall within the cur-
rent time window.
6. Server Rate = 600 reqs/sec [20]; ∆ = 200 msec [24][25][26]; L= 1024; 
τ = L/S
1 wopt min Ar L,( )≤ ≤ wopt
c1 Ar•
c2 1 l )–( )•
----------------------------=26
The unit costs of communication, computation, namely, c1 and c2, were 
taken as network communication latency to the RCS, and computation 
delay at the application server, respectively. For CDNs, the communication 
latency is on average 200 ms [24][25][26], and the computation latency 
may range from 200 ms to 1000 ms [27][28][29]. The value of Ar, which is 
the average access count required by a client per application was taken at 
two boundary values: 6, 60 [30][31][32][33]. Usually clients have varying 
request patterns, but on average very few clients exceed sixty accesses to 
the CDN server during any session. The interarrival time (t), was taken to 
be in the range 0.01 ms to 200 ms, where 0.01 ms is the case of a typical 
DDoS attack [34][35], during which attempts are made to fully flood the 
server with large number of requests originating at short spans of time. 
t=200 ms is the typical interarrival time to the server during normal opera-
tion.
Note: For t=200 ms, the rate control scheme is not required, as requests 
are coming in at a rate lower than maximum server rate.
4.1.3 Results and Observations
Due to the randomness in the arrival process to the RCS, 100 samples 
were taken at each plot value, and a 95% confidence interval was built at 
each point on the plot. Assuming that the sample mean of n (=100) obser-27
vations is Y, the random variable Y is normalized by the transformation: 
, where, σ is the population variance computed for the differ-
ent plot values. Z has a standard normal distribution, and by letting zα/2 
denote the upper α/2 X 100 percentile of the standard normal distribution, 
where α = 0.5, we obtain: 
, where
the random interval  is the confidence interval, and 1- α is 
the confidence level. For the experiment, we took the value of the confi-
dence interval to be 0.95 i.e. we are 95% confident that the actual mean lies 
in the confidence interval calculated, for which z0.025 = 1.96 [13].
Due to the deterministic nature of the server utilization and the waiting 
times, and owing to its direct dependence on the parameter values, in par-
ticular on the value of l, the confidence intervals turned out to be at a small 
range of less than 1% deviation from the mean values, and thus did not 
overlap, as can be seen in the plotted graphs.
Utilization
1. The application server utilization was observed to be lower (~7%) for 
δr = 30 seconds, as compared to the case with δr = 3 seconds, where the uti-
lization is almost 50% for larger values of l, as can be seen in Figures 4.1, 
4.2, 4.3 and 4.4. This behavior is caused by the fact that the value of δr has 
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a direct relation with the time window size. Thus, increasing values of δr 
lead to larger time windows for the clients to place their requests in, and 
considering the fact that the number of accesses (wopt), is the same for 
both the cases, the server utilization went down for increasing δr. 
This phenomenon can be verified from Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4, 
where the server utilization is steadily increasing for increasing values of l, 
and is better for δr=3 seconds, than for δr=30 seconds. For increasing val-
ues of l, the wopt value increases, and since increasing l implies increase in 
the population of legitimate users, fewer users (1-l), abstain from placing 
their requests in the allotted time slots for causing an underutilization 
attack against the server resources. Thus, the server utilization steadily 
increases with increase in the value of l. 
2. During the event of a “flash crowd” (i.e., high l and low t), the utiliza-
tion of the server was roughly 50-70%, as can be seen in Figures 4.1, 4.2, 
4.3 and 4.4. This shows that the rate control scheme never allows the 
demand to the application server to exceed capacity at any time, and at the 
same time ensures reasonably good utilization. In this case, the high l and 
low t imply majority legitimate clients, who actually place their respective 
requests during the allotted time slots, and arrive at the server at short time 
interarrivals.29
3. A DDoS attack (i.e., low l and low t) against the server is defined as an 
underutilization attack, which may occur when a number of illegitimate cli-
ents request for tickets to the rate control server, and when provided with 
tickets, abstain from utilizing their respective time slots at the application 
server. Owing to this, the application server remains underutilized during 
those particular time slots, and hence the server utilization drops. The rate 
control scheme adjusts to this case by reducing the value of wopt, and 
hence reducing the overall time at the server, during which it remains idle 
due to the attack. As we can see from Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4, the uti-
lization of the server remains around 5% even during the case where l=0.1 
(90% of the clients are illegitimate), thus showing that the attackers do not 
fully succeed in their attempt to cause an underutilization attack.
Average Waiting Time
The average waiting time perceived by the clients is directly proportional 
to the value of δr, with higher values of δr leading to higher waiting times, 
and vice versa. The individual time windows assigned to the clients 
increase in size with increasing value of δr, thus pushing subsequent clients 
further off into the future before service is provided to them. Therefore, as 
can be seen in Figures 4.5, 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8, the waiting time is very high 
for δr=30 seconds, and much lower for δr=3 seconds. 30
For increasing values of Ar, the waiting time increases as well, and again 
this is due to the direct proportionality of the value of Ar to the value of 
wopt, with higher Ar leading to larger optimal window sizes (accesses), and 
thus larger time windows, thus in turn pushing subsequent clients further 
off into the future before service is provided to them.
The following observations were made from the results:
1. For c1/c2 = 200/16, the waiting time was around 10-40 seconds for 
δr=3 sec, Ar =6, and for Ar=60 with other parameters remaining the same, 
the waiting time went up to 100-900 seconds. Varying value of Ar has a sig-
nificant impact on the per-client average waiting time. This is because for 
larger values of Ar (60 in this case), the per-client accesses provided are 
higher, and thus larger time windows are reserved for clients at the applica-
tion server; consequently, subsequent clients have to wait for longer time 
periods, before being provided service.
2. Increasing value of δr also has a significant impact on the waiting time, 
with higher values of δr leading to higher waiting times compared to lower 
values. This behavior is due to the fact that the time window provided to 
clients increases with increase in the value of δr, and thus larger time win-
dows are provided to clients to place their requests in, and hence subse-
quent clients have to wait for longer before service is provided to them.31
3. For c1/c2 = 200/1000, the waiting time is lower, as compared to c1/c2 
= 200/16, as can be seen in Figures 4.5, 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8. Higher value of c2 
implies that server side computation is more expensive than the communi-
cation delay to the rate control server, and hence it can prove expensive to 
lose it. The wopt (accesses) value provided to clients is lower for c2=1000, 
as compared to c2=16, due to the inverse proportionality between wopt and 
c2, as can be seen from the formula for computation of wopt. Thus, for 
higher c2 (=1000 in this case), the wopt value is lower, and hence clients 
are provided with smaller time windows for placing their respective 
requests, and therefore, subsequent clients do not have to wait for long 
before service is provided to them.
4. During a DDoS attack (i.e., low l and low t =0.01, 1 ms), as can be seen 
in Figures 4.5, 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8, the average waiting time is around 100 sec-
onds for c1/c2=200/16, δr=3 sec, and Ar=60, and is around 20 seconds for 
c1/c2=200/1000. The waiting time is even better for the case with Ar=6, 
with c1/c2=200/16 giving a waiting time of around 15 seconds, and 
c1/c2=200/1000 giving a waiting time of 10 seconds. This shows that for 
systems where the waiting time is critical, the cost of computation may be 
increased beyond the communication cost, or the average number of 
requests given per client may be brought down to say Ar=6, rather than 
having a large value for it. In addition, δr<=3 seconds is a reasonable value 32
for the maximum interrequest delay for a particular client, as in Figures 
4.7, 4.8 we can see enormously high waiting times for cases with δr=30 
seconds.
5. During the event of a “flash crowd” (i.e., high l and low t), the waiting 
time is around 600-800 seconds for c1/c2=200/16, δr=3 seconds, Ar=60, 
and is around 50-90 seconds for the same parameters, but for Ar=6, as can 
be seen in Figure 4.5. For the case with c1/c2=200/1000, δr=3 seconds, 
Ar=60, the waiting time is around 100-180 seconds, and for the same 
parameters but with Ar=6, the waiting time is around 50 seconds. This 
result further strengthens our argument for placing an upper limit on the 
value of Ar, used for computation of the optimal window size (wopt), with 
higher Ar leading to very high waiting times, and lower values providing 
reasonable waiting time guarantees to the clients, before actual service is 
provided to them. Again, for the case with δr=30 seconds, we have 
obtained very high values for the waiting times, and thus it may not be con-
sidered as an implementation case.
Effect of Variations of Number of Clients on Utilization, Waiting Time
The server utilization remains the same for variations in the value of N, 
the number of clients. This is because neither the time window size, nor the 33
wopt value, that are provided to the individual clients are affected by the 
client population. 
The client waiting time is severely impacted by variations in the client 
population. Due to the relatively small interrequest delays at the rate con-
trol server, we have clients coming in more or less at the same time, and for 
larger populations, this means that the per-client waiting time goes up with 
the client population, as is evident from Figures 4.9, 4.10, 4.11 and 4.12, 
where we have a steady increase in the waiting time with increase in the 
client population.
Figure 4.1: Server utilization vs. l
Im pact of variation of 't', Delta-r on utilization
Utilization vs . 'l'  C1/C2 = 200/16  Ar = 6  Num  Clients = 10000


















t=1 ms, Delta-r=3 sec t=0.01 ms, Delta-r=3 sec
t=1 ms, Delta-r=30 sec t=0.01 ms, Delta-r=30 sec34
Figure 4.2: Server utilization vs. l
Figure 4.3: Server utilization vs. l
Impact of variation of 't', Delta-r on utilization
Utilization vs. 'l'  C1/C2 = 200/16  Ar = 60  Num Clients = 10000




















t=1 ms, Delta-r=3 sec t=0.01 ms, Delta-r=3 sec
t=1 ms, Delta-r=30 sec t=0.01 ms, Delta-r=30 sec
Impact of variation of 't', Delta-r on utilization
Utilization vs. 'l'  C1/C2 = 200/1000  Ar = 6  Clients = 10000




















t=1 ms, Delta-r=3 sec t=0.01 ms, Delta-r=3 sec
t=1 ms, Delta-r=30 sec t=0.01 ms, Delta-r=30 sec35
Figure 4.4: Server utilization vs. l
Figure 4.5: Average Waiting Time vs. l
Im pact of variation of 't', Delta-r on utilization
Utilization vs. 'l'  C1/C2 = 200/1000  Ar = 60  Clients = 10000
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t=1 ms, Delta-r=30 sec t=0.01 ms, Delta-r=30 sec
Impact of variation of 't', Delta-r on W.T (sec)
W.Time vs. 'l'  C1/C2 = 200/16  Num Clients = 10000



























t=1 ms Ar=6 t=0.01 ms Ar=6 t=1 ms Ar=60 t=0.01 ms Ar=6036
Figure 4.6: Average Waiting Time vs. l
Figure 4.7: Average Waiting Time vs. l
Figure 4.8: Average Waiting Time vs. l
Im pact of variation of 't', Delta-r on W.Time
W.Time vs. 'l'  C1/C2 = 200/1000  Ar = 6  Clients = 10000
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Im pact of variation of 't', Delta-r on W.T (sec)
W.Time vs. 'l'  C1/C2 = 200/16  Num Clients = 10000
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Im pact of variation of 't', Delta-r on W.Tim e
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t=1 ms Ar=6 t=0.01 ms Ar=6 t=1 ms Ar=60 t=0.01 ms Ar=6037
Figure 4.9: Average Waiting Time vs. Client Population
Figure 4.10: Average Waiting Time vs. Client Population
Figure 4.11: Average Waiting Time vs. Client Population
Im pact of variation of 't', Delta-r on W.T(sec)
W. Tim e vs. N  C1/C2 = 200/1000  Ar = 6  
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Im pact of variation of 't', Delta-r on W.T(sec)
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t=1 ms, Delta-r=3 sec t=0.01 ms, Delta-r=3 sec38
Figure 4.12: Average Waiting Time vs. Client Population
4.2 Rate Control Scheme applied to DNS Root Name 
Servers
The Domain Name System, DNS, translates domain names to IP 
addresses. The data used for this mapping is stored in a tree-structured dis-
tributed database, where each name server is responsible for its portion of 
the hierarchy. The Root Name Servers are located at the root of this tree, 
and play a major role in name resolution at the high levels [3][8].
4.2.1 DNS Name Resolution Scheme
DNS specifications are most popularly implemented using the Berkeley 
Internet Name Domain (BIND) software. The process of name resolution is 
Im pact of variation of 't', Delta-r on W.T(sec)
W. Time vs. N  C1/C2 = 200/1000  Ar = 60  



























t=1 ms, Delta-r=3 sec t=0.01 ms, Delta-r=3 sec39
completely transparent to the end user, however, it may lead to unusually 
long delays before the user may be given access to the service [8]. 
Initially, the client (end user application) in a given local area network 
sends a request for host name resolution to the local name server. The local 
name server looks up the name in its local cache, if found, returns the 
address to the client. In the case when the name is not present in the local 
cache, the local name server recursively follows referrals until it gets an 
answer. The root of the tree contains the root servers, which are responsible 
for name resolution of top level domain (.com, .net, .edu etc.) servers.
DNS root name servers are a key center to most activities on the Internet, 
as local name servers frequently need to update their respective caches with 
name to IP-address mappings by sending requests to the DNS root name 
servers. Therefore, if the root name servers come under a DDoS attack, 
they may be incapacitated from providing regular and timely services to 
their respective clients, as is evident from the October 21st, 2002 attack 
[17], during which, nine of the thirteen root name servers were temporarily 
flooded with requests originating from spoofed IP addresses, thus disabling 
them from providing any further service for about an hour.
Due to the significance of the problem, we decided to carry out experi-
ments examining the performance of the servers, and client waiting times, 
when the RCS scheme explained earlier, is integrated into the DNS system.40
4.2.2 Simulation Experiment
We carried out simulations to mimic the behavior of a distributed client-
server system, when the Rate Control Scheme was implemented in the sys-
tem. The simulator was written in C, and was run for different client popu-
lations, generating requests for service to the RCS. 
Assumptions
The following assumptions were made before carrying out the simulations:
1. The counter values (wopt), which are given to individual clients based 
upon their requests, are decided as follows:
, where,
c1: unit cost of communication = 1
c2: unit cost of computation = 10
Ar: access count per application = 6 [36][37]
l: percentage of legitimate clients in the system
δr: maximum inter-request delay requested by a client = 90 ms [41].
2. Clients are assumed to have independent, non-overlapping windows of 
time at the Application Server, during which they may place their requests.
3. Time window computation is done as follows:
ti = tw + ∆
ti+1 = ti + w(τ + 2∆ + δr)
4. The traffic arrival process at the RCS is poisson, with exponential 
interarrival times.
1 wopt min Ar L,( )≤ ≤ wopt c1 Ar•
c2 1 l )–( )•----------------------------=41
5. The Verifier rejects requests that are not eligible to fall within the cur-
rent time window.
6. Server Rate = 5000 or 12000 reqs/sec [38][39]; ∆ = 81 msec [40]; L= 
1024; τ = L/S
DNS computation service time is more valuable to lose as compared to 
the communication delay, as there are many mission-critical, as well as 
real-time operating clients waiting in anticipation of being provided access 
to the naming service within a guaranteed time period. Therefore, the ratio 
c1/c2 was selected to be 1/10, implying that the server-side computation in 
the DNS environment is 10 times more expensive to lose as compared to 
the communication delay to the RCS. This ratio of the two costs gives a 
strict lower bound on the value of wopt, and further changes in the values 
of l (percentage of legitimate clients) lead to higher values of wopt, but not 
crossing the upper bound given by: Min(Ar, L). 
4.2.3 Results and Observations
As with the case for the CDNs, the confidence interval for the various plot
points was taken at 95%, and the results showed less than 1% deviation
from the resulting mean, and thus did not overlap with adjacent curves.42
Utilization
1. For higher values of δr = 1sec (the maximum per-client interrequest 
time), the time window size (ti - ti+1), that was given to the clients, based 
on the following formulae
ti = tw + ∆, and
ti+1 = ti + w(τ + 2∆ + δr)
was higher, as compared to cases with δr = 1ms - 90 ms. The reason being 
that, for higher δr, clients are provided with larger time windows to place 
the same number of requests as in the case with lower δr, thus leading to a 
lower utilization at the application server, as is seen in Figures 4.15, 4.16, 
4.17 and 4.18.
In Figure 4.13, the upper case shows the situation, where the time win-
dow size provided to the clients is larger owing to the higher δr requested, 
and the Utilization is 20/(10*Server rate). In the lower case, the Utilization 
is 20/(5*Server rate), thus showing the better utilization for lower δr‘s.
Figure 4.13: Impact of δr variation on the server utilization
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2. During the event of a “flash crowd” (i.e., high l and low t), the utiliza-
tion of the server was roughly 12% for server rate (S) = 5000 reqs/sec, and 
around 5% for S = 12000 reqs/sec, which are both below the maximum 
server capacity, thus displaying the working of the rate control mechanism 
in disallowing any type of flooding that may take place at the application 
server during peak traffic hours by majority legitimate clients (l ~1 implies 
majority legitimate clients).
Note: The utilization is much higher for lower server rates, as compared 
to higher rates for the same number of accesses (wopt), due to the inverse 
proportionality between server utilization and the server rate (by defini-
tion).
3. During the event of a DDoS attack (i.e., low l and low t), the utilization 
still remains above zero (seen in Figures 4.15, 4.16, 4.17 and 4.18), as the 
wopt size shrinks for lower values of l, thus disallowing illegitimate clients 
from being successful in their attempt to cause an under-utilization attack 
at the server, by abstaining from placing requests in their respective time 
slots at the application server. The low value of wopt leads to smaller time 
window sizes, and thus illegitimate clients, who are trying to launch an 
underutilization attack will not be successful to the extent they would have 
been in the case with larger time windows.44
The ideal DDoS attack situation is when we have the attackers coming to 
the RCS with high frequency (low l with low t), and requesting tickets with 
a very high δr, thus making the RCS provide time windows much larger 
than normal. These big time windows will most certainly lead to a severe 
underutilization at the server, as clients will be provided with the same 
number of accesses (wopt), but with larger time windows, as is seen in Fig-
ures 4.15, 4.16, 4.17 and 4.18. The solution to this problem is to place an 
upper bound on the value of δr, which the clients may request. From Fig-
ures 4.15, 4.16, 4.17, 4.18, it is evident that the utilization is better for 
δr=1ms, and is reasonable for δr=90 ms, which is the also the usual average 
that may be requested by clients in the DNS service, as compared to cases 
with δr=1 sec. Therefore, the condition 1 < δr < 90 msec, must be placed on 
the value of δr, in order to ensure better resistance to the DDoS underuti-
lization attack against DNS root name servers.
Average Waiting Time
The average client waiting time to service is directly proportional to δr. 
For higher values of δr, the time window provided to the clients is larger, 
and thus subsequent clients are pushed off further into the future before ser-
vice is provided to them. This higher waiting time is observable in the DNS 
rate control scheme, where the average interarrival times are less than a 45
millisecond, unlike other services, where the average interarrival times are 
higher, and thus waiting times may be lower. Owing to this low interarrival 
time in the DNS setup, the larger the client population, the higher the aver-
age waiting time. This behavior takes place due to the fact that a larger 
number of clients are coming in to the RCS to request for tickets, with 
more or less the same arrival time, and they are provided with time win-
dows well ahead into the future. Thus the average waiting time per client 
goes up substantially with the total population.
Figure 4.14: Access window allocation to clients
The following observations can be made from the results:
1. For higher δr (~1sec), with client population of 10K, the average wait-
ing time was between 45-100 seconds, as compared to cases with δr= 90 
ms and δr= 1ms, where the average waiting time was between 8-20 sec-
onds, as is seen in Figures 4.19 and 4.20. The reason for such a long wait-
ing period is that δr has a direct impact on the time window sizes given to 
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individual clients, during which they may place their requests, as is seen in 
the time window computation formulae below:
ti = tw + ∆
ti+1 = ti + w(τ + 2∆ + δr)
Thus, with higher values of δr, the clients are provided with larger 
time windows to place their requests in, and hence subsequent client 
requests are pushed off further into the future, before service is provided to 
them. 
2. During the event of a “flash crowd” (i.e., high l and low t), the average 
waiting time stays below 20 seconds for cases with . Thus it is 
advisable to place an upper bound on the value of δr, that may be requested 
by a client, so as to reduce the waiting time to service for subsequent cli-
ents. Clients who may not be able to place their requests during the time 
window provided to them due to the smaller δr value may re-issue a request 
for a ticket to the RCS, for subsequent accesses.
3. During the event of a DDoS attack (i.e., low l and low t), for higher 
values of δr (~1sec), which typically is the case during an underutilization 
attack, the average waiting time was around 45 seconds, as is seen in Fig-
ure 4.19 and 4.20, whereas for lower δr, the waiting time was between 8-10 
seconds, which again suggests that the system designer place an upper 
0 δr 90ms< <47
bound on the requested value of δr. So we may again conclude that δr must 
lie in the following range: 0 < δr < 90.
Effect of Variations of Number of Clients on Utilization, Waiting Time
The server utilization remains the same for variations in the number of 
clients (N). This is because neither the time window size, nor the wopt 
value provided to the individual clients are affected by N. Therefore, having 
20 requests in 20 seconds, or having 40 requests in 40 seconds give the 
same server utilization.
The client waiting time is severely impacted by variations in the client 
population. The small interarrival times of the DNS system (~0.86 ms, 0.03 
ms), imply that a large number of clients are requesting tickets from the 
RCS in a back to back fashion, and are provided with time intervals pushed 
off well into the future. Thus the per-client average waiting time goes up 
substantially, as is evident from Figures 4.23 and 4.24, where for l=0.1, 
δr=1 ms and N=100K, the average waiting time is around 100 seconds, and 
for l=0.9 and other factors remaining the same, the waiting time is around 
200 seconds. Again, Figures 4.23 and 4.24 show a very high waiting time 
for cases with δr= 1sec, thus further strengthening our earlier suggestion 
for placing an upper limit on the value of δr for the DNS system.48
Figure 4.15: Server Utilization vs. l
Figures 4.16: Server Utilization vs. l
Impact of variation of 't', Delta-r on utilization
Utilization vs. 'l'  C1/C2 = 0.83/10  Ar = 6  Num Clients = 10000
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Figure 4.17: Server Utilization vs. l
Figure 4.18: Server Utilization vs. l
Impact of variation of 't', Delta-r on utilization
Utilization vs. 'l'  C1/C2 = 0.83/10  Ar = 6  Num Clients = 100K
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Figure 4.19: Average Waiting Time vs. l
Figure 4.20: Average Waiting Time vs. l
Impact of variation of 't', Delta-r on W.T(sec)
W. Time vs. 'l'  C1/C2 = 0.83/10  Ar = 6 Num Clients = 10000
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Impact of variation of 't', Delta-r on W.T(sec)
W. Time vs. 'l'  C1/C2 = 0.83/10  Ar = 6 Num Clients = 10000
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Figure 4.21: Average Waiting Time vs. l
Figure 4.22: Average Waiting Time vs. I
Impact of variation of 't', Delta-r on W.T(sec)
W. Time vs. 'l'  C1/C2 = 0.83/10  Ar = 6 Num Clients = 100K
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t=0.03 ms, Delta-r=1 ms t=0.03 ms, Delta-r=90 ms
t=0.86 ms, Delta-r=1 sec t=0.03 ms, Delta-r=1 sec
Impact of variation of 't', Delta-r on W.T(sec)
W. Time vs. 'l'  C1/C2 = 0.83/10  Ar = 6 Num Clients = 100K
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Figure 4.23: Average Waiting Time vs. Client Population
Figure 4.24: Average Waiting Time vs. Client Population
Impact of variation of 't', Delta-r on W.T(sec)
W. Time vs. Client Population  C1/C2 = 0.83/10  Ar = 6  l = 0.1
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Im pact of variation of 't', Delta-r on W.T(sec)
W. Time vs. Client Population  C1/C2 = 0.83/10  Ar = 6  l = 0.9 
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Future Work
With the ever expanding gap between the network line rate, and the server 
throughput, user-level agreements have to be imposed in order to check on 
the load imposed on the server, be it a DNS root name server, or a CDN 
server. This thesis evaluated the performance of a novel rate control mecha-
nism to control the traffic arrival rate to two types of servers, namely, DNS 
root name servers, and CDN servers. In particular, the application server 
utilization, and the client waiting times were studied for variations in the 
input parameters: c1, c2, Ar, l, δr. 
The results obtained from the simulations were at par with our expecta-
tions:
1. Increasing client population led to increase in the per-client waiting 
time, however, the server utilization remained unaffected.54
2. Increasing values of the maximum interrequest time requested by a cli-
ent, δr, led to increase in the per-client waiting time, and lower server utili-
zation.
3. Increasing values of the average number of requests used for wopt 
computation, Ar, led to an increase in the per-client waiting time, and lower 
server utilization.
The following bound is suggested to be placed on the value of δr, so as to 
give reasonable waiting time guarantees to the clients.
- CDN Network: 0 < δr < 3 sec.
- DNS Network: 0 < δr < 90 msec.
The values of the parameters that characterize applications such as the 
average number of accesses required, Ar, and the maximum interrequest 
delay, δr, and not just the communication and computation delays vary 
greatly from one network to another. Thus, the system designer must 
choose appropriate values of these application parameters before deciding 
on the optimal number of accesses, and time window sizes to be given to 
individual clients. This is the case because both the client waiting time, as 
well as the server utilization are affected by these values.55
Future Work
The simulation done in this thesis involved independent non-overlapping 
time windows, during which clients were expected to place their requests. 
However, overlapping time windows may be experimented with, and 
results may be obtained for analysis and comparison with the current 
results. This would enable us to concretize the bounds we have decided 
upon for certain parameters.
Considering the rising usage of wireless networks, the application of the 
rate control scheme simulated in this thesis to wireless networks has to be 
studied with extensive simulations. The results obtained will allow us to 
study the impact this scheme would have on the behavior of wireless net-
work servers, as well as the client waiting time guarantees. 
As all resources that become very common, wireless networks will face 
the same problems in security, as faced by wireline networks today, includ-
ing DDoS attacks. Thus, it is essential to provide solutions to such prob-




/*  Author: Zubair Baig
This program models the rate control server soln. for the DDoS problem 
proposed by Dr. V.D.Gligor. The arrival process of the requests from the 
clients to the Rate Control Server is Poisson, with exponential interarrival 
times(as per definition). The tickets granted to the clients contain ti, ti+1 
values.
   ti = Delta + first available time window.
   ti+1 = ti + w(Tau + 2*Delta + Deltar)
Number of accesses granted (w) depends on the value of wopt.
We are considering the case with single client per window.
The value of 'l' will decide the arrival of requests at the Verifier(Appl. 
Server), and thus the utilization.57
The service time at the server is exponential with average time equal to 
some number.
We will record the total time the client has to wait before getting the ser-
vice.We will also check the utilization of the app. server 








/* ALWAYZ USE MILLISECONDS AS UNITS.........!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!*/
const double AVG_INTERARRIVAL_TIME= 0.01;
                                        /* Interarrival time at RCS (msecs)*/
const double AVG_SERVICE_TIME= 100.0;   /* Service time at the 
appl. server (msecs)*/
const double MAC_PROC = 0.0;   58
const int AR_MAX = 6;/* Ar upper limit */
const int AR_MIN = 1; /* Ar lower limit */
typedef struct RCS_ticket{
int client_id;
double arrival_time; /* Arrival time to the TGS */
double ti; /* Tx */
double ti1;/* Ty */
int num_reqs;   /* # of Requests for tickets made by client */
double ctr;        /* Max. number of requests given to client */






double simulation_time = 0.0;
const double DELTAR = 30000.0;/* Max. gap between 2 consecutive 
requests.(in msecs) */
const double DELTA  = 200.0;        /* Network delay (in msecs) */
 
const double Ar = 6.0;
const double C1 = 200.0;





/* Computing the value of Wopt for different values of paramters */
/* This function computes the interarrival time between consecutive 
requests








value = rand() % 100;
random_Y = (double)value/100.0;
if (random_Y == 0.0)
random_Y = 0.01;
arrival_time = -(log(random_Y)/(1.0/AVG_INTERARRIVAL_TIME));60
result = arrival_time ;
if (result == 0.0)
result = 0.0;
/*if (result > 100.0)
result = rand() % 100;
printf("Interarrival time is %f\n\n",result);
*/
return (result);
}   /* End of function */
/* This function computes the interarrival time between consecutive 
requests








value = rand() % 100;61
random_Y = (double)value/100.0;
if (random_Y == 0.0)
random_Y = 0.01;
service_time = -(log(random_Y)/(1.0/AVG_SERVICE_TIME));
result = service_time ;
if (result == 0.0)
result = 0.0;
/*if (result > 100.0)
result = rand() % 100;
*/
printf("Service time is %f\n\n",result);
return (result);
}   /* End of function */
/**********************************************/







}/* End of function */
/**********************************************/
/* This function computes the utilization at the appl. server, # of visits on 
avg. per client
to the RCS, as well as the Avg. Waiting Time for each client before get-
ting the service. */







double num_visits = 0.0;
TAU = L/APP_SERVER_RATE;
legitimate_clients = l * (double) NUM_CLIENTS;




   total_time += (rcs_ticket[cnt].ti1 - rcs_ticket[cnt].ti);
   total_ctrs += rcs_ticket[cnt].ctr;
}







/* Computing the Avg. Waiting Time per client */
for (cnt=0;cnt <NUM_CLIENTS;cnt++)
{





















 printf("\n l\tWopt\tUtil(%%)\t W.T(msec)\t# visits\n");




     interarrival_time[cnt] = expon_interarrival();    /* Computing the inter-
arrival time for the clients*/
   
   rcs_ticket[cnt].arrival_time = simulation_time + interarrival_time[cnt];
  
   simulation_time += interarrival_time[cnt];        /* Total time for simula-
tion */65
   rcs_ticket[cnt].num_reqs = rand() % AR_MAX;      /* Each client 
makes a req. for random # of w */
   while(rcs_ticket[cnt].num_reqs <AR_MIN)
rcs_ticket[cnt].num_reqs++;
}     /* End of for loop */
/* Providing the ti..ti+1 values to the clients */
  for (cnt=0;cnt<NUM_CLIENTS;cnt++)
  {
   rcs_ticket[cnt].ti = rcs_ticket[cnt].arrival_time + MAC_PROC + 
DELTA;
   }      /* End of for */
 
 rcs_ticket[cnt].ti1 = rcs_ticket[cnt].ti + rcs_ticket[cnt].ctr*((double)TAU 
+ 2.0*DELTA + DELTAR);
/* Checking for overlap */
 if (cnt != 0)
 {
   if (rcs_ticket[cnt].ti < rcs_ticket[cnt-1].ti1)
rcs_ticket[cnt].ti = rcs_ticket[cnt-1].ti1; 
  }
/* Computing the Utilization at the Server */
for (cnt=0;cnt<(int)legitimate_clients;cnt++)
{
   total_time += (rcs_ticket[cnt].ti1 - rcs_ticket[cnt].ti);66
   total_ctrs += rcs_ticket[cnt].ctr;
}








/* Computing the Avg. Waiting Time per client */
for (cnt=0;cnt <NUM_CLIENTS;cnt++)
{

















} /* End of function Compute */
/**********************************************/
/* Function Main */
int main (void)
{ int cnt,cnt2;




  for (cnt=0;cnt<NUM_CLIENTS;cnt++)
  {
   rcs_ticket[cnt].client_id = cnt;
   rcs_ticket[cnt].deltar = DELTAR;                  /* Constant value */
interarrival_time[cnt] = expon_interarrival();    /* Computing the interar-
rival time for the clients*/
   
   rcs_ticket[cnt].arrival_time = simulation_time + interarrival_time[cnt];
   simulation_time += interarrival_time[cnt];        /* Total time for simula-
tion */68
   rcs_ticket[cnt].num_reqs = rand() % AR_MAX;      /* Each client 
makes a req. for random # of w */
   while(rcs_ticket[cnt].num_reqs <AR_MIN)
rcs_ticket[cnt].num_reqs++;
}     /* End of for loop */
/* Providing the ti..ti+1 values to the clients */
  for (cnt=0;cnt<NUM_CLIENTS;cnt++)
  {
   rcs_ticket[cnt].ti = rcs_ticket[cnt].arrival_time + MAC_PROC + 
DELTA;
   }      /* End of for */
TAU = L*1000/APP_SERVER_RATE;
printf("\n");
printf("C1          = %0.1f msecs\n", C1);
printf("C2          = %0.1f msecs\n", C2);
printf("Ar          = %0.1f\n", Ar);
printf("t           = %0.3f msecs\n", AVG_INTERARRIVAL_TIME);
printf("Server Rate = %d reqs/sec\n",APP_SERVER_RATE);
printf("Queue length= %d reqs\n",L);
printf("TAU         = %d msecs\n",TAU);
fprintf(fd1,"/*************************\n");
fprintf(fd1,"\n");
fprintf(fd1,"C1          = %0.1f msecs\n", C1);
fprintf(fd1,"C2          = %0.1f msecs\n", C2);69
fprintf(fd1,"Ar          = %0.1f\n", Ar);
fprintf(fd1,"t           = %0.3f msecs\n", AVG_INTERARRIVAL_TIME);
fprintf(fd1,"Server Rate = %d reqs/sec\n",APP_SERVER_RATE);
fprintf(fd1,"Queue length= %d reqs\n",L);
fprintf(fd1,"TAU         = %d msecs\n",TAU);
/* This for loop will execute for diff. values of l (% of legitimate clients) 
*/
/****************************************/
printf("\n l\tWopt\tUtil(%%)\t W.T(msec)\t# visits\n");
  fprintf(fd1,"\n l\tWopt\tUtil(%%)\t W.T(msec)\t# visits\n");
  for (l = 0.0; l <0.9; l += 0.1)
  {
Wopt = sqrt ( (Ar * C1)/(C2 * (1.0-l)));
/*Assigning the value of ctr to the individual clients */
for (cnt=0; cnt<NUM_CLIENTS; cnt++)
{
  if(rcs_ticket[cnt].num_reqs < (int)Wopt)
   rcs_ticket[cnt].ctr = (double)rcs_ticket[cnt].num_reqs;
          else
   rcs_ticket[cnt].ctr = Wopt;
rcs_ticket[cnt].ti1 = rcs_ticket[cnt].ti + rcs_ticket[cnt].ctr*((double)TAU 
+ 2.0*DELTA + DELTAR);
/* Checking for overlap */70
 if (cnt != 0)
 {
   if (rcs_ticket[cnt].ti < rcs_ticket[cnt-1].ti1)
rcs_ticket[cnt].ti = rcs_ticket[cnt-1].ti1; 
  }
}
  rcs_ticket[cnt].ti1 = rcs_ticket[cnt].ti + rcs_ticket[cnt].ctr*((dou-
ble)TAU + 2.0*DELTA + DELTAR);
printf(" %0.2f\t%0.2f\t",l,Wopt);
fprintf(fd1," %0.2f\t%0.2f\t",l,Wopt);
       /* Calll the function 'compute' to find out the utilization, #of visits, 
waiting time */





/* Checking the behaviour of a normal server with M/M/1 */
normal_server(); 
} /* End of Main */71
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